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AN EIJIPIRICAL STUDY OF
PROPERTY TAX CAPITALIZATION
IN THE CLEVELAND AREA

Submi tted by Kevirc Adler
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Economists have long'criticized the property tax on two
counts

-- inherent assessment inaccuracies and regressivity

with respect to income.

The first proble m is somewhat

bureaucrat i c in nature, being the . esponsibility of the
assessors.

The second, however, looks into the heart of the

property tax because it charges that the tax is
fundamentally flawed.

This paper will present evidence that

rejects the iegressivity notion.
Trad i tionally, tax theory held that t he proper.ty tax was
regressive -- that is, its burden fell more heavily on low income
persons.

A newer model, begun with the work of Harberger (1962)

and Mieszkowski (1967),1 suggests that the tax is really not
regressive. This model is being generally applied to empirical
testing today, so this paper will begin by presenting the old and
new theories before beginning empirical work made possible by the
new theory.
Using a framework identified by Oates (1969), this paper
will synthesize the new tax theory with the work of Tiebout
(1954) in an effort to estimate the rate of capitalization of the
property tax on single-family homes in the Cleveland area.
Some modificat·ions will be made to increase the accuracy of the
Oates I:lodel with the goal the same -- finding e'lidence about
property tax capitalization.

The regression results show a high

high capitalization of the property tax, and the implications of
the findings for individual municipalities and general tax

i ,cidence will then be reviewed ,
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THE TRADITIONAL MODEL
For purposes of analysis, the property tax is usually
divided into two parts:

a tax on land and a tax on structures. 2

No distinction is drawn in traditional an alysis between a uni.form
nation-wide tax levy and varying jurisdictional rates.
the impact of the tax
imposed is

Also,

beyond the market area in which .i twas

not fully analyzed on the assumption that the outside

effects ar e

minimal.

Both are weaknesses that the general

equilibrium theory tries to correct for.
partial equilibrium analysis will

For now, however, the

be presente d, first for

land and then for structures.
Essentially, the tax on land is borne by the ,, owners of
land because land is fixed in supply.

If land is fixed in

supply, the diagram below shows what happens to the
landowner's profits when a tax is imposed.

f. {] P.I f*
_ _A

- - -_.._- The value that the us e r places on the land is shown above as
point

p~;

It
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a lso th e pr ice the landowner i s getting for

3

his land.
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(Whether the user of the land also happens to be

the owner of it is irrelevant, for the land still Qas a
value of

P~

to him.)

When the tax

(T dollars for each unit

owned) is imposed, however, the landowner mus t pay the tax,
and this lowers the value of his land by the total tax
dollars he pays.

The user still values the land at

will not pay more foX' it,

P~

and

so the tax comes solely out o f

the earnings of the landowner.

His new profit is depicted

by the demand line (D'l with his new after-tax net profit
being P f for each unit owned.
his land but only retains PI
tax collector.

The landowner is paid p* for
' the remainder going to the

Since owners of land bear the full burden of

the tax on land and since landowners are generally the
wealthier people in our society, that part of the tax is
progressive.

Wealthy people are taxed at a higher rate than

poorer people.
The supply curve cannot shift in response to the tax because
the dispersion of land ownership is too wide to allow for
collusion by landowners.

Since supply is already at the

landowner's profit-maximizing price, he will simply absorb the
tax.

The key to this scenario is the rigidity of the supply

of

land curve, an assumption that fits the situations in American
metropolitan areas accurately.
extended in these
being used.

3~eas

The supply of land cannot be

because the land is already bought up and

Toe available supply of land CQuid possibly be used

more intensively - - that is, to earn more profit per acre -- but
the tax collector will simply collect a higher amount of money
because the value or the land hAS risen,

.,

too.JEven if the land
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is more profitable because it switched to a more profitable use,
the landowner will still not keep all of his profits. The
elasticity of the demand curve is irrelevant under these
circumstances, too, since the tax effectively just eliminates
some portion of the demand, is pictured.
The analysis of the tax on structures is similar to that for
land, except that supply is not assumed to be fixed in the long
run.

The reason that the supply of structures is not fixed is

that 'building or maintaining them is based on the profitability
of doing

if the return to investment is great enough the

50;

structure will be built or (if it already exists) fixed.
the ?ossible exception of a
on this earth is fixed
profitable to do

50.

with

rare landfill, the amount of land

more cannot

be "built" even if it is

Structures are not as easily limited, and

so a property tax will affect the supply of structures in that it
will reduce the profitability of building or maintenance, hence
reduce the supply.
Q~

level of

The end result is that the profit-maximizing

for the owner/producer of structures will shift if a

property tax is imposed.

This is shown below:

I

j

I
::0

./

1-_

0'1 i

"f' i

rI

/'

/'

Q

5+(0("+""-{)

5

The old price
Q ,.

(P~ )

Kevin Ad ler

and quantity available

(Q~)

change to

P, and

Owners bear part- of the burden of the tax on structures in

the form of lower values and profits

(P~-P~).

Part of the burden

falls on the us ers of the structures in the form of higher 'prices
(PI -P'.f).

On net, less is produced and at a higher cost to the

consumer

(who can be thought of as the demander of structures or

products built in those structures) .

Again, the slopes of the

supply and demand lines determine the exact magnitudes of the
burdens.

The more vertical the demand line or the more

horizontal the supply line, the more regressive the tax is.

The

key poiClt Is that a shift which splits the burden of the tax between
the consumer and the producer has occurred.
Viewing the situation in more concrete terms, consider
landlords who rent apartments.

They will seek to recover the

cost of any new property tax by shifting some of the burden to
tenants.

They can do this several ways: raise rents to cover

some portion of the tax; maintain the building poorly but keep
rents constant,

thereby recouping some of the tax by lowering

other costs; or not building more apartments so that the supply
is limited, and as aging buildings fall into disuse the decreased
supply will eventually raise the rent.

All of these scenarios

are depicted in the previous diagram

the supply curve is

raised and therefore so are prices.

If this tax then falls more

hea vily on the poorer c ons umer, then it is regressive;

the

poorer people would be shouldering a larger part o f the tax
burden that

\,;:P"·0 ! ;.'.L

e~rafioRs/ could

shift to the cost of the product.

Bearing the land c ,)U property e ff e cts in mind, the question
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of incidence (burden) of any given property tax was often
answered by considering how much of the consumer budget went to
paying the property tax itself or paying for goods produced on
land and by structures/capital the tax involved.

The ratio o f

consumption to income decreases in the short run, so the property
tax appears regressive when studied in this manner.

Residential

housing, for example, shows a marked tendency for poorer people
spending a higher percentage of their incomes than the wealthy
do.

Even ifburden of the tax is distributed equally on all

homes, then the poorer people will still be spending more of
their budgets proportionally
people will.

on the property tax than wealthier

This analysis holds for all consumer goods;

assuming that some part of the property tax is shifted from
producers to consumers, the consumers who will be paying the most
are those who spend the highest proportion of their incomes on
those goods.
Many studies in the 1950's and 1960's used this type of
analysis to conclude that the property tax burden falls heavily
The results of some of these studies are reproduced

on the poor.
below: 4

Table 3-1. Estimates or the Property Tax as a Pcrccn(ngc of Income under {he Tr:tdition.·tJ View, by Income Clnss. Various Years. 1957-70

locome classes in thousands of dollars; other figures in percent
Nelzer-J957
Money

Non,esi~

il! c~me

dential

classb
Less than 2

. 2-3
3-4
4-5
', 5-7
7-10
10-15
15 an d over

MusgrQves-J968

Re3i.
dentlal

Total
propf?rly properly property

Income classb

4.0

3.3

7.3

Less than 4

o.~

1.::;

5.0

3.2
3.4
2.2
1.6
1.3
1.7

1.4
1.4
1.7
2.0
2,7
1.6

4.6
4.8
3.9
3.6
4,0
3.3

4.0-5.7
5. 7- 7.9
7.9- 10.4
10.4- 12.5
12. 5-17.5

- ,

17.5- 22. 6

22 .6-35.5
35.5-92,0
92.0 and over

Average. all
classes

Tolal
property

6.7
5.7
4.7
4.3
4.0
3.7
3.3
3.0
2,9
3.3

classes

Family
income

Total

c!assb

properly

Less than 3

6.5

3-5

4.8
3.6
3.2
3.2
3.1
3. 1

5-10
10-15
15-20
20-25
25-30
30-50
50-100
100-500
500-1,000
1,OOO,and over

3. 9

classes

ACIR--1970
Family

3.0

2.8
2.4
1.7
0.8

Average. aU

Average, all

4.6

Pcchmoll-Okllcr-1966

3,4

iI/come ."

c1assb
Less rh.!ln 2
2-3
3-4

Res;df!nlia/
properlY-

16.6
9.7

7.7
6.4
5.5
4.7

4-5
5-6
6-7
7-10
10-15
15-25
25 and over

3,7
3.3
2.9

Average, all
classes

4.9

4.2
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The consensus among them is that poorer families spend more of
their budgets (percentagewise) on housing and other consumer
goods (which have some part Qf the property tax shifted into the
cost) than wealthier families do.

That is, the property tax is

regressive.
Aaron does a fine job of identif yi ng the weaknesses of the
tradi ti onal analysis, which will be quickly mentioned.

First,

the studies done by Okner, Netzer, etc. used the i.ncome of a
single year when considering the burden the property tax places
on consumers of housing.
regressivity.

This biases the results towards

Th is happens because the peak and trough years of

family income are not averaged.

The inequalities' between poor

and wealthy are much greater in a one-year period because the
poor have a tendency to have a very low incom'e year and the
wealthy tend to have unusually high income years.

The

inequalities in income over five years, for example, are far less
than those over a single year,
Aaron points out. S
,

The result is

that a poor family might seem to be spending an incredibly high
portion of its income (even over 100%) on goods, and a
correspondingly large percentage on the property tax for that one
year \vhen in reality it was only because the year's income was
particularly low.

Looking over five years, however , it could

become apparent that the family's income/consumption ratio is - not
rea lly d ifferent than wealthy fami lies ',

For wealthy famili es

one year may give an artificially l ow consumption/income ratio if
that was a very good year.

Kevin Adler
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The following set of-graphs should make the point more
clear, as they show the changing incomes of a wealthy family and
a poor family over five years compared to the five-year average.
The average of a single year can be misleading:
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The consumption/income ratio for the poor family in the fourth
year is vastly different than the family's ratio over the five
year period.

It gives the ratio

as 1, which is higher than the

average of .8; and for the wealthy family the opposite is true
the ratio in the fourth year (.67)
average of .8.

is lower than the five-year

The result is that the poorer family seems to be

spending far more of its budget than the wealthy family does when
in fact it i s only doing so in the small time frame of that
single year.

If the burden of the property tax fell on each of

these families at an identical rate, say 10% of thei r spending,

the tax would seem to be extremely regressive when in fact it was
the same 10% burden on each.

In a grouping of large numbers of

people this situation will happen enough to make it seem as if

9
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poorer people are spending more of their budgets on goods and
therefore more of their budgets on the property tax than the
wealthy people are .
I n addition, averaged or "normal" income is viewed as a
better predictor of the spending tendencies of a household.
Studies using normal income have found little variation in the
percentage of money going in to housing expenditures across
income levels.

Aaron, using the same method as previous studies but

switching to a five-year average of income, found the property
tax to be proportional except to some renters in the lowest
income ranges.

His results are reprinted

below~

Table 3-3. Estimates of Relation of Home Value, Tax Rate, Property Tou ,Payments,
"
and Rent to Normal Income) 1967-71 SampJe Pcricd

Simple regressio,,.

Coefficient

Elasticity item
Homeowners
Home value (Ey.l')

1.132
Ojl4
Tax rate (E"y)
Property tax pa)'ITlents (Er.y) 1.246

Multiple regression"
I-value '

I-value

Coefficient

13.7
1.6
10 .8

0.995
0.013
1.077

10.4
0.2
10.4

10.4
0.1
6.4

0.336
-0.040
0.491

-0.1
5.6

Renters

Rent (ER.Y)
Tax rate (E•. y)
Property tax pa)ments (E:r.r:)
Property tax payments,
adjusted for value-rent

eJasticityb (ET,r) (Evl1u-)

0. 561
0.009
0.569

0 .85!HJ.962

S.3

O. SO(H). 567

The point to be made is that there is doubt even in the
t~aditional, partial equilibrium approach that the tax is

fundamentally regressi ve.

Assessment inequities, if anything,

probably create much of the discr epa ncy in the burden because
more valuabl e homes are often asse ssed at a lower percentage of
true market value.6Thi s is not done by law but by the mistakes
of the assessors .

10
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THE NEWER APPROACH
On to the newer view, also termed general equilibrium
analysis.

General equilibrium analysis tries to account for all

changes in price and quantity in all markets that a given tax
change causes. 7 It does not simply consider the changes in the
market where the tax is levied, which is essentially what the
older view did.

For the property tax specifically, the

modification of theory also allows the economist to distinguish
between a nation-wide tax and one imposed locally at different
rates.

This is the key to my empirical work. 8

The essence of the new view is that all owners of capital
bear some portion of the property tax.

The analysis is composed

of three parts: a uniform national levy on all land and capital;
the burden from different rates in different localities; and the
effect on the supply of land and capital of those different
rates.

This model assumes a perfectly competitive world with the

demand of one consumer to be a fairly exact microcosm for society
at large.
First, if a uniform tax was levied on all capital and land
the owners of capital and land could not shift this burden.

The

reason is quite simple -- there would be no untaxed sectors to
shi ft to.

The owners of capital and land would be faced with the

same fixed supply situation of the traditional theory, and prices
would not be raised because the owners were already at the
profit-maximizing point.
f~ts

Part of the property tax in our nation

this model. since some minimal property tax is imposed

ever'ywhere.

The val u e of a home to i ts owner would be reduced by

"

,
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the imposition of an additional, nationwide property tax, for
example, but the selling price of the home would remain the same.
This is progressive 9 iecause those wealthy enough to own land and
capital would pay the full amount of the tax.
However, all property taxes are not levied uniformly across
the country. either on goods or by localities.

The question is

what e ffect do the deviations about the mean have on the owners
of capital and land.

The old view would predict that the owners

would use mechanisms to shift the burden to consumers, but the
general equilibrium approach indicates that the owners will
instead bear most of the burden.

This will happen when owners

shift capital in an attempt to maximize their return on
investment after the imposition of an uneven tax has created a
disequilibrium.

This will change the profitability of capital,

land, and other factors of production.
Capital, which is presumed to be extremely

supply elastic

in the long run/will be shifted to alternate uses so that the
after~tax

returns to capital are again equalized across regions.

Consider the basic general equilibrium approach of two adjoining
localities each filled with similar and competing industries.

If

the property tax is increased in one locality the profitability
of capital there will be lowered in comparison to the other
region's capital.

Capital will tend to be shifted out of the

high-tax area, driving the supply of capital down in that place,
bringing the price up.

At the same time the influx of capital

into the low-tax area will lower the price of capital there and
the profitability of owning capital.
of graphs on the next page.

This is shown in the series

Kevin Adler
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Until the after-tax returns equal eachother (point C on both
graphs) this shifting will continue.

The end result is a return

to cap i tal that i s lower in each area thaD before the extra tax
was imposed in the first region.

The owners of capital are

bearing the incidence of this tax change.
Land is fixed in overall supply, but the new view recognizes
the effects that shifting capital may have on the uses of land in
competing jursidictions.IOShifting capital from the high to the
low-tax area will reduce demand for land in the high-tax area.
This will result in lower prices being offered for the land, the
burden falling on landowners as it had in the older view.

The

price of land in the low-tax region will rise, however,
because of the extra demand for its use.

In fact, it is

hypothesized that the supply of lftnd may even increase in the
low-tax area if there is some undeveloped land for which high
bids are made.
The real wages of members of the labor force may also be
affected.

Real wages may decline for workers in high-tax places

because they will have less capital to work with, hence not work
as effeciently.

Or the owners of businesses that choose to

remain in the high-tax place may try to directly limit wages to
make up for some p art of the tax.

In either case the labor force

(a mobile body) will begin to shift from the high to low tax
area, driving down the supply curve and wages in the latter.

If

labor is fully mobile, real wages will equalize .between the
localities in much the same way as capital does in the long run.
If labor and capital are fully mobile in the long run, then

14
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land, which is immobile will bear the difference in the tax
rates.

This difference is capitalization, evidence of which my

empirical work will be trying to find.

Capitalization .is

especially possible in the different jursidictions within a
single metropolitan area because landowners cannot stop the
movement of labor or capital within the area.

Workers will be

willing to live in several places in the metroj,Jolitan area
because they can still get to their jobs easily in this wellconnected area.

Capital will be shifted to the place where it is

least expensive to own because the demand for what it produces
(or the demand for capital itself) does not change within the
well-connected metropolitan place. The only types of capital that
will not move, in fact, are structures like

hous~s

or factories.

Factories may close down, but homes in particular are as immobile
as land and therefore bear a great deal of capitalization, as is
being tested by my empirical work.
Aaron uses this new
the property tax.

approach to estimate the incidence of

His work shows regressivity in some of the

lower income groups but a strong progressive nature as incomes
rise; his work is reprinted as Appendix A.

He feels that his

results show "a reduction· in capital income" brought .about by the
property tax.

While some of his data is i mprecise, it does show

one way in which the general equilibrium approach can be used to
study tax incidence nationally.

The advantage of using general

e quili b rium t e sting is ag reed wpo n
econo ~ ists

a l~os t

un iversally by

today because it accounts for the shifting of capital

assets that occur between taxing jurisdictions that levy at
dif .E erent rates .

15
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THE TIEBOUT HYPOTHES I S
Next,

it is important to consider the typical environment in

which America's property taxes occ'.. r.

Most people l i ve near a

fairly large (50,000+ person) city, that is, within a Standard
Metropolitan Statistical Area. 11 The SMSA is comprised of small
communities sllrrounding the central city, which is the hub of the
business and a good deal of the entertainment acitivity for the
SMSA.

This generalization fits the model suggested by Charles

Tiebout (1956) quite nicely. 12 His first four restrictions,

when

considered, mark out a reasonable picture of how our society
works today:
1. "Consumer-voters are fully mobile and will
move to that community where their :preference
patterns, which are set, are best satisfied.
2.

Consumer-voters are assumed to have full
knowledge of differences among revenue
and expenditure patterns and to react
to those differences.

3.

There are a large number of communities in
which the consumer-voters may choose to live.

4.

Restr ictions ; due to employment opportunity
are not considered ... "

To put this into the present world a
realistically,
upon

the

once people have

decided

metropolitan area in which they will live, they

will choose
money.

let us say:

little bit more

t~e

municipality that gives them the most for their

The implications of this are impor tant in the context of

the new ideas about tax incidence.
It has been stated that in a relatively well-connected
metropolitan area property owners have little chance to shift

16

Kevin Adler

higher property t a xe s to the workers or consumers; the immobile
aSset, land, will bear the brunt of the higher tax.

Above-

average tax rates without accompanying increases in benefits
merely lower the attractiveness of a particular area and
therefore lower its value and price.

The situation is the same

for homeowners who are faced with homebuyers who shop around for
the area with the most benefits for tax dollars.

Going one step

further, a family will determine the benefits a community
provides for the m according to its own preferences and utility
curve.

Those preferences will then be weighed against the cost

of living in that area.

The property tax is a major component of

that cost, hence places with higher property taxes and the same
ammentities will be less attractive to the homebuyer.
there will be worth less;

Homes

that is, the property tax will be

capitalized into the value of the home and land, the immobile
factors in the general equilibrium equation.
THE MODEL
Are these different tax rates between jurisdictions actually
reflected in home value, as has been theorized?
taxes capitalized?
study.

Are property

These are the questions being tested by this

The importance of capitalization is that it helps to

identify the incidence of the property tax: it tells what the
elasticity of the demand for housing line is. 14when coupled with

the theory of tax incid ence , the rate of capitalization will give
a better idea of how the property tax is actually falling.

I

have chosen to use single-family homes for my study because they
are the largest portion of these tax-generating structures in

17
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It seems liRely, too, that families are more

affected by the ammenities of an area than a business would be ,
making their capitalization a better reflection of the true
situation.l 5
To test for capitalization I have worked with Oates' model
and made modifications that will hopefully improve upon the
accuracy of it.

I will review Oates' model, pointing out my

changes which were usually made with reference to the work of
King (1973).
To begin with, there are four basic variables that determine
the value of a given house: accessibility to the place of

work~

quality of the specific house; quality of the specific
neighborhood~

and the costs incurred in living

refers to the variables

th~re.

King

as land, structural, and locational,

and taxes, respectively.
Oates suggests that the basic land characteristic is the
distance the home is from the center of the central city of the
SMSA since that is where a high percentage of the population goes
for work and entertainment.

He uses "linear distnace of the

municipality to midtown" as his measure of accessibility.

The

alternative is average minutes needed to travel to the . center of
the city, which in tuitively see ms to measure the trouble involved
in getting there slightly better.

Unfortunately, the second is

far more difficult to measure (depending on the time of day when
on e is travelling,

~."hich

route is used ,

e t c . ) so I will use the

actual linear distance along major thoroughfares.

Also, I am

going to use a measure of how many people from each municipality

18
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actually do work in Cleveland.

This is a variable used by King,

and it helps to weight the relative importance of the central
city for each town.

This will help to overcome the problem that

many people do not use Cleveland as much as the Tiebout
Hypothesis suggests they do; I do not want to overestimate
Cleveland's importance to the surrounding towns or underestimate
the pull of the Lorain-Akron SMSA in this way.
On structural issues Oates uses the number of r ooms in a
house as a proxy for the size, percentage of home s in an area
over 20 years of age as a proxy for age, and family income as a
proxy for other structural traits.
st~aightfo~ward:

The

fi~st

two are pretty

larger homes are worth more, and older homes are

often in worse condition (and have fewer years left to stand) and
so are worth less.

The third is based on the belief that

wealthier families buy nicer homes on average, all else being
equal.

King suggests delving more deeply into the specific

characteristics of homes by using assessors' data on specific
houses, but since I am using an aggregated model the specifics do
not seem relevant.

16 In fact, this data can only be obtained after

the home is sold, so in many cases the sample
really

be

representative.

is too small to

The one change I will make is that

in one of my re gressions I ~vill us e an a verage of fainily income
over a five-year period instead of the income of just the
previous year.

This wa s s uggested by Aaron (explained in detail

above) as a more accur ate p redictor of family's h om e-buying
habits.

The inclusion of this variabl e enabled Aaron to show far

les s regressiveness of the property tax than earlier models had;
so it will be interest ing to see wha t its effect on
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capitalization percentages will be. 17
The third set of variables is the most difficult to
quantify,

those of locational value.

These are the benefits of

living in a certain neighborhood or municipality, and often the
measures used are of questionable accuracy.

As Oates points out,

"frequently the only fea s ible proxy for public output i s some
measure of inputs."

He used the expenditure per pupil in public

schools as a measure of quality of services.

This was used

because previous research had determined that the quality of
schooling is often the most important public ammentity to a
family moving into an area.

Schools are generally the most

direct and largest beneficiary of property tax collections,
making them a fairly direct measure
money outlays.

King used data on

of perceived benefit from
a

child's performance on

standardized tests as a measure of the quality of education, but
he did not really find that to be any more "effective" than
general school spending, which he also tried.

18For that reason,

and the reason that perceived quality is possibly as important
as actual quality (and perceived quality comes from public
spending not test scores) I will follow Oates' model.
The final variable in determining the value of a given home
is the cost of living in the given communi t y.

This is the

property tax, specifically the "effective" tax rate rather than

the legal tax

rate~

This takes into account the problem that

assessment rarely if ever measures the full value of a house.
the effective rate I will use the property tax collected per
house divided by the actual (selling) price of the home. 19

In

For
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addition, I used the inside 10 mill rate -- the legal rate -just for comparison with the " true" rates. 20
Finally, Oates included some miscellaneous variables that I
find attractive.

He used the percentage of families living below

the poverty line because these families are more likely to rent
homes rather than buy.

Not consider ing thel!'. would then tend to

underestimate the median family income of homeowners.
Fortunately, I was able to find data on the median income of
families in owner-occupied homes, which will eliminate that
problem~

Oates also had a measure of growth in the municipality,

which indicates an increase in demand for homes and rising home
values.

I will use the percentage change in population over the

last decade as my measure of that variable.
My var iables are listed below, and to the left of them is
the sign that each is expected to take, according to the
explanations previously advanced and past research:
Dependent Variable:
H= Median sale value of homes in a given
municipatity
Independent Variables:
(-) Min= Travel miles to Cleveland business district
from center of city along major roads.
(-) Wght= Percentage of people of city who work in
Cleveland.
(+)
Rooms= Hedian number of rooms per owner-occupied
housing.
(-)
Age= Percentage of homes under 20 years of age
(+)
Inc= Nedian family income for 1980.
(+)
IncM= Mean family income for 1980 .
(+)
IncS= Median family for 1976-1980:
(Inc1980+0.8(Inc1979) + •.. +O.2 ( I nc 1976 » .
3
(-) RTax= Taxes paid per owner-occupied home.
(-) NTax= Legal mill rate inside 10 mil.
(+) School= Average expenditures per pupil in public
schools.
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(+) Grow= Population change in area from 1970-1980 .
To confirm the intuitive reasoning for

the signs I expected

I

ran single regressions on the dependent variable. for each of the
independent variables.
suggest.

All were related as the theory would

The results are in Appendix

S.

The municipalities I have chosen to study are cities and
townships from the four counties that make up the Cleveland SMSA;
Lake, Geagua, Cuyahoga, and Medina.

The counties were chosen

because they have traditionally been considered part of the
Cleveland area in census reports, and they rely fairly heavily on
Cleveland for job opportunities.

I have 57 cities and townships

in my study, ranging in size from l,OOO,OOO-person Cleveland to
lOOO-person Spencer.

Only a few of the municipalities studied

are farther than 25 miles from Cleveland or rely on it for less
than 10% of the jobs.

210ne final note -- I did not use villages

(the third type of municipality in Ohio) in my study because some
of the data was not available on them, and the data that was
available was only marginally accurate because it was by census
tract rather than exact village boundaries.
THE REGRESSIONS
I began with the basic regression of my dependent variable
(median value of owner-occupied housing) on eight independent
variables in a multiple regression: Min, Wght, Rooms, Age, Inc,
RTax, Schaal, and Grow.

22The results are below:

..
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TABLE 1
VAR

COEFFICIENT

ROOMS
INC
WGHT
MIN
AGE
SCHOOL
RTAX
GROW

-69.73
3.57
-222.86
75.00
74.62
4.22
-7.21
2.40

T-STATISTIC
.03
12.83
2.20
.40
1.39
2.'10
1. 24
.07

F-Test (8,48) = 93.929
Upon reviewing the results from my first regression,

it is

evident that only a few of the variables are significant.

Only

three, family median income, % working in Cleveland, and the
money per pupil in public schools show explanatory power with 95%
confidence.

Still, the R2

value is very high, and so the model

is explaining a large portion of the value of a home -- what
needs to be done is to improve upon the number of explanatory
variables.
First, it see ms reasonable to use the natural logs for the
independent variables.

Natural logs are useful when the

increase in the value of . an individual data point in one of the
explanatory variables has a diminishing marginal utility_
e xample.

For

this model contains a variable measuring the distance

the center of the municipality is from Cleveland;

the farther

away the municipality is from Cleveland, however, the less

diff e rence it would
wa s added.

See!fl

to make to a homeowner if anot her

mil~

In other words, living four miles further from

Cleveland makes a big difference if one wa s only four miles away
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to begin with, but if one was forty miles away then four more
miles would not really have an effect.

I chose to take the

natural log of all of my independent variables and regress them
on the same median house variable as in the first regression.
The table below shows the results:
TABLE 2
VAR
ROOMS (LN)
INC (LN)
WGHT (LN)
l-IIN (LN)
AGE (LN)
SCHOOL (LN)
RTAX (LN)
GROW (LN)

COEFFICIENTS

T-STATISTIC

-11865.88
120457.10
-8112.75
-6257 . 61
3785.06
6947.88
-731. 86
-123.88

RJ..= .9273

.55
12 . 16
3.64
1. 50
1. 97
1.12
.53
.16
F-Test

(8,48)~

76.4977

In this regression the median family income and percentage
working in Cleveland are again significant and of the correct
signs.

Improvement comes as the age of the homes in the town

improves its significance to nearly the 95% level.

Unfortunately

the school expenditures loses its explanatory power, though once
th e o r iginal data file replaced for SCHOOL replaced the natural
log form it did regain its T-value.

Evidentally, extra money spent

on schools is rarely vi e wed as diminishing in its marginal returns by
ho me bu y er s .

However , the variable I was testing, the tax rate, still did
not produce a significant value.

I had used as a measure of

taxes the mone y each ho me owning fam ily had paid (RTa x) 1

whi c h was

literally how much each ho usehold paid in propert y taxes each
year.

This biased the results, though, because a family with a

more exp e nsi ve house might be paying more in taxes but not more
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in proportion to the value of its house1 and I needed to test the
data in this proportion.

For this new tax measure I simply

divided the previous tax expense by the median house value.

"I

then re-ran the basic regression with better results:
TABLE 3
VAR

COEFFICIENTS

ROOMS
INC
WGHT
HIN
AGE
SCHOOL
New RTAX
GROW
R

=

.9432

T-STATISTICS

010

-211.45
3.50
-202.46
112.15
74.55
4.26
- 7125.61
2.50

13.30
2.04
.62
1. 42
2.90
2.09
.07
F-Test (8,48) = 99.5881

For the first time in the series of regressions, the tax
rate is significant.

Its sign is also correct, meaning that

higher taxes will lower the value of a house, all else being
equal.

The three variables that were significant in the first

regression are significant again, hence the explanatory power of
the equation (94.3 %)

is its highest yet.

This equation did not

perform better when coupled with the natural log of the median
home values, and in fact , the T-st3tistic on the new tax rate
fell to roughly 1.5. 23
Table 3 represents the best T-statistics that could be
obtained from the basic model with all the theoretical values
~9presente~,

either as the actual data points or as the natural

logs of those points.

However, the extremely high T-statistic

values for the median family income variable indicated that
perhaps the regression was not as accurate as it could be.

The
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very high correlation coefficient (.953) between the dependent
variable and the family income variable also indicated a problem;
the variable was simply overwhelming the other variables.

To

test for this multicollinearity I dropped the median family
income variable from the regression in Table 2, with the NewRTAX
included.

The results:
TABLE 4
VAR
ROOMS (LN)
WGHT (LN)
MIN (LN)
AGE (LN)
SCHOOL (LN)
GROW (LN)
New RTAX

COEFFICIEN1'

T-STATIS1'IC

1. 63
-.548

6.72
1. 04
2.09
1. 86
3.26
.75
3 .05

-.21
.087
.468
.014
- .504

,
R": .7671

F-Test (8,48) : 19.7569

The growth in explanatory value of many of these variables
indicates the way in which the median income variable dominated
the earlier regressions. The R2 is still fairly high, as is the
F-test, mostly because the- number of rooms per home variable
became quite powerful.

In fact, this was the only regression in

which the Rooms variable had a 95% confidence level because it
was the only regression in which the median
overshadow it.

inco~e

did not

New estimates of the median income variable

should be made to reduce the multicollinearity it has caused so
that it can be placed in the regression once more.

In addition,

when regressions were run without the median income and the number
of rooms represented, the population change variable (GROW) was
significant for the first time, and the other variables had far
\

---
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more explanatory power; perhaps, then, both the median income and
average number of rooms var.iables should be modified to accoun t
for multicollinearity, as they are highly-correlated (. 8270).

I

have not yet included new estimates of ROOMS or INC, but clearly
this should be done.

CAPI'::'ALTZATION
Before presenting the rate of capitalization of this model,
it is important to realize that full capitalization can cause a
great change in the value of property.

If a house has a life of

40 years and an annual rent of $2,000

it will be worth $5,000

less if a 2% property tax differential between it and another
identical home is fully capitalized.

This is presented by the
'.

,. For property of a finite life. in this case forty years, we have:
"'0

V

Y"

40

= ' 2:
(I + r)' _,.-= 12:
- 1
.. 1

(Y- tV)
(1

+ r)'
.

(NI)

•

'here V = market value of the property;' Y = gross annual rental income, y"
t:-1I!r tax) rental income, r = rate of discount. Solving for V, we get:

Y>--.
[ " (1 1 r) ]
1";"'1

V=

-r

['2 1 1
I + t ,~, (I + r)'

=

net

(N2)

.:):C!:~ a rate of :liscount of 5 percent, the (lifference cited in the te~t is calculated from
~ ! ~:xpres.sion:

V

~he

=

52,000m
+ .02m)

(1

52,OOOm
+ .04m)

(1

results of Tables

=

S?S 550 _ 520350
-.
•

= $5200
"

(3) 3nd (4) show the degree to which

the property tax is capitalized in the Cleveland ar.ea.
=c.!l.lati

')'1

that. is c):e8te(1 by Table (3)

is as fo.1.10ws:

The
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House Value = -32953 - 211.45 ROOMS + 3.5 INC -202.46 WGHT +
( .10)
(13.3)
(2.04)
+ 112.15 MIN + 74.55 AGE +4.26 SCHOOL (.62)
(1.42)
(2.90)
- 7125.61 NewRTax + 2.50 GROW
(2.09)
( .07)
This means that an increase in the tax rate on a home of 1% will
reduce the value of that home by roughly $7,100.

With the

average home value in the study roughly $66,000, this decrease
amounts to almost 11% of the value of a home.

Full

capitalization of a one-percent tax differential on a
$65000 is $7477, as shown by the equations below:

My model, equation (1) then indicates a nearly complete
capitalization of the property tax in the Cleveland SMSA.
The results of equation (1) seemed too good to be true, so I
tested the capitalization rate again using the data of Table(4).
The equation coming from Table(4) is shown below, and all but
NewRTax have been changed out of the natural log form in which
they appear in in Table(4) -- NewRtax has been left the same
because it never was in natural log form.

Equation 2:

,,
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.997 + .489 ROOMS

.601 WGHT - 1.546 MIN
(1.04)
(2.09)

(6.72)

+ 2.44 AGE +.759 SCHOOL
(1.86)
(3.26)
+4.27 GROW (.75)

.504 NewRTAX
(3.05)

Looking, then, at NewRTAX it can be seen that it represents a far
more reasonable estimate of capitalization.
$65,582

The median home of

becomes 11.05 when made into a natural log for this

equation,

and so the coefficient of NewRTAX (-.504) accounts for

a change of about 5% per unit instead of the 11% of equation(l).
Full capitalization of the natural log of the median house value,
done in a manner similar to the expected full capitalization of
the first equation would result in a coefficient of 1.25 for
NewRTAX, hence the .504 figure is able to explain a little over
40% of the Cleveland capitalization.

This is closer to the Oates

model which explained roughly 66% of the ca pitalization and had
an R'?r. of .93.

The R for this equation is only. 7671 in my model,

b ut this loss of explanatory power is due to the elimination of
the median income variable.

With corrections for

multicollinearity it seems probable that the capitalization
percentage will rise, just as the R2

will.

The correct

capitalization percentage undoubtedly lies between the 90+% of
equation(l) and the 40% of equation (2) .
Of

cou ~s e,

if the additional tax dollars that a municipality

gained from a tax increase were used to increase spending on a
good that the citizens of the municipality valued; a tax increase
could actually raise the values of homes.

If school
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expenditures, for example, were increased with the extra tax
dollars from a property tax increase, then the model would
predict that the average home would increase in value since the
SCHOOL coefficient is larger than the NewRTAX coefficient and is
positive.

This is consistent with the Tiebout Hypothesis , which

suggests that characteristics a community values will increase
the value of homes in that community.

Specifically, going back

to equation(2) the coefficient of SCHOOL is +.739, which
indica~es

that a one-percent rise in public school expenditures

will increase property values by .235.

Making evidence of

capitalization even more vivid, it must be remembered that
expenditures on public schools account for only qbout 50% of the
budget of the communities in my samples, hence a 1% rise in tax
revenues can provide more services than
rise in public school allocations.

simpl~

a corresponding 1%

Additional public goods can

be provided, too.

CONCLUSIONS
Using aggregated data and a cross-sectional model I sought
to discover the rate of capitalization of the property tax in the
Cleveland SMSA.

I encountered problems in obtaining significant

values for several of the explanatory variables in my model,
though the problem was lessened by the fact that the
e x trem e ly high,

If

was

indicating that the fewer significant variables

had most of the explanatory power anyway.
Capitalization of the property tax occurs in the Cleveland
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area, but the rate of capitalization is still in question
somewhat.

Certainly it is at least 40%, as equation(2)

indicates, but it is probably higher -- closer to the 90%
estimation that equation (I) produces.

There are two reasons for

the continued uncertainty about the capitalization rate.

First,

corrections must be made for the multicollinearity present in the
variables (most notably in median income and number of rooms per
home)

to gain a truer picture of the rate of capitalization.

Preliminary indications of the strong multicollinearity effect
can be seen in Table(4),
accounted for an R2

where eliminating a variable that often

value of over.4

whole model by only .15. 24

reduced the R

of the

Second, the cross-sectional analysis

does not identify how far along in the process of capitalization
the Cleveland SMSA is;

capitalization does not happen instantly,

so the full change of house values caused by a tax rate change
may not be realized until one sells his house many years later.
Finally, capitalization indicates that the owners of
property are bearing a high proportion of the tax on their
property.

This implies, according to the general equilibrium

tax analysis, that the property tax is not regressive because
those with property are having the value of that property reduced
by the property tax.

Owners of land and capital structures (such

as homes, in this study)
tax;

are bearing the burden o f the property

unlike the partial equilibrium studies of the 1950's found,

this study indicat es that owners of

pro~erty

and capital cannot

pass the burden of the tax on to the buyers of their property.

If

property owners c annot pass on the cost of the property tax to
property buyers, then t he tax is not regressive because wea lthi e r
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people own more property and capital relative to their incomes
than poorer people do.
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FOOTNOTES
1.

Mieszkowski modified Harberger's theory on incidence of the
corporate income tax to fit the property tax.

2.

My explanation of traditional tax theory is based on the
explanation in Henry Aaron's book, ~ho Pays the Esoperty Tax?,
which is listed in the bibliography, as are all other subsequent
references.

3.

The concept of extensive versus intensive margins of land
cultivation is explained in Stonier and Hague, Chapter 13.

4.

Reprinted from Aaron, page 26. His sources were books
written by the authors of the various studies.

5.

Five years is just what Aaron decides to use -- there is
g=~at deb~te about what the best accounting period is.
In
general, however, an unduly short accounting period makes the tax
look regressive towards people with fluctuating incomes, namely
the poor.

6.

Several studies have been done that indicate this is a
problem. One is by

7.

This explanation is based on Aaron, Boadway's Public Sector
Economics, and the two Mieszkowski articles.

8.

The models before Oates generally looked "at taxes as a
national occurrence or by comparing large areas, usually SMSA's.
Both systems missed the point Tiebout raised about people living
within an SMSA, which is the focus of this study.

9.

Or at least proportional.

10 .

Th~

intensity-of-use idea again.

11.

Roughly 7~% of America lives within an SMSA, according to
the 1980 Census Reports.

12.

His full model and some of the implications he tried to draw
can 'be found in, "A Pure Theory 'o f Local Expenditures," National
Tax Jou.rna 1 , 1956.
Tiebout suggested that in addition to his
model showing how suburban populations grouped themselves
together into homogeneous communities, it implied that this wa s
the most efficient wa'l for the SMS .lI. to work. This has since been
refuted theoretically,' but the model still stands as providing
the basis for many types of empirical tests.

14.

100% capitalization implies that the demand for housing is
elastic.
People are responding to r ising costs by reducing
demand. The other extreme, no capitalization, implies a far more
vertical demand line, and hence a less progressive property tax.

1

· FOOTNOTES (cont.)
15.

More importantly, all the ammeniti es in a neighborhood are
not relevant to a business in the way they are to homeowners . It
is extremely difficult to quantify what area characteristics are
valuable to a business.

16.

The Urban Center has been collecting this data for each home
sold since 1982, but it is only for Cleveland, not the
surrounding communities.

17.

Its effect turned out to be negligable, so I have not
mentioned it in the discussion of my results. It probably
came out as irrelevant because the income of 1980 was so highly
corelated with home value in the first place.

18.

King writes, "What is desired is a measure of the ability of
the school to impart knowledge and skills to pupils. Yet
acheivement scores reveal only what the pupils can do and are
silent on the school's role." (pg. 57). In addition to trying
the above "objective" measure, he tried teacher-student ratios,
which are essentially the same as expenditure per pupil.
F~nallYl he tried a questionaire with the opinions of the
homebuyers about the school system and found this "highly
correlated"
(+.67)
with the above measures.

19.

That is the best approximation of the sales-assessment ratio
that I could obtain. Those ratios have not been kept on the
towns in this area until the Urban Center-began with Cleveland
and its nearby suburbs in 1982.
I also tried the taxes each
home paid, disregarding the value of the home (as will be
explained later), and found this to be less satisfactory.

20.

Never was significant, which indicates that people are very
careful to learn exactly what they will be paying for their
home's property tax rate rather than worrying about what the
legal rate is.
This adds to the contention of capitalization
theory that people are very aware of what the property tax is
costing them versus what it is "buying" them.

21.

Perhaps a regression series should be run without the 8
municipalities that use Cleveland for less than 10% of their
jobs, and incidentally, are all farther than 25 miles away_

22.

·rhe variables are all listed on page 20.
Remember that RTax
will be switched to NewR'rAX later on in the regressions .

23.

Using LN(House Value) makes intuitive sense. The difference
bet'ween a $10 7 000 and $20 OOO house 'is far greater than the
difference between a $100,000 and $110,000 house. Some variab les
improved their T-statistics with the LN(House Value) variable.
j

24.

Movi ng !rom Table (2) to Table (4), for example, reduced the
total R by .1602 even though the excluded var iable had accounted
for .3782 of the R2 .
2
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